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Introduction 
 
The Criminal Justice Act 2003, section 287, inserted section 51A into the 
Firearms Act 1968, thereby creating a presumptive minimum sentence of 5 
years’ imprisonment for anyone convicted of possession of a specified firearm. 
The maximum penalty for the offences is 10 years. The Violent Crime 
Reduction Act 2006, section 28 extended that provision, and added another 
minimum sentence to cover cases of using another person to mind a specified 
firearm. Section 51A, the focus of this article, is a minimum sentence provision 
which requires that, in the absence of ‘exceptional circumstances relating to the 
offence or the offender which justify its not doing so’ the court must impose a 
custodial sentence of at least 5 years on any offender who was aged 18 or over 
when he committed the offence, or a custodial sentence of at least 3 years on an 
offender who was aged 16 or 17 when he committed the offence. While it is of 
course undeniable that firearms offences are always serious, and that some cases 
merit custodial sentences of at least the length prescribed by the minimum 
sentence, this article argues that the minimum sentence provision causes 
considerable difficulty.1 It was legislated in haste, has proved to be problematic 
in practice, and it stands in the way of the development of proper sentencing 
guidelines for firearms offences. 
 
In the first decision of the Court of Appeal on the provision Lord Woolf CJ in 
Rehman and Wood2 said that deterrence was the objective of the minimum 
sentence. His Lordship said that Parliament had listed those weapons in the 
section the possession of which made it important to pass deterrent sentences to 
‘convey a message … so as deter others’ and therefore ‘pay less attention to the 
personal circumstances of the offender’3. The emphasis on general deterrence 
here may be contrasted with other minimum sentence provisions in England and 
Wales, such as the minimum three-year sentence for the ‘third-strike’ house 
                                                          
 
Thanks are due to Lyndon Harris for his insightful comments, and to Professor Allan Manson of Queen’s 
University, Kingston, Ontario, for his assistance and advice in relation to the Canadian Supreme Court 
authorities referred to in this article. 
1 In the course of her judgment in Davidson Sharp LJ said that ‘There is no doubt that the statutory provisions 
requiring the imposition of minimum terms pose a particular challenge for sentencing judges.’ 
2 Rehman and Wood [2006] 1 Cr App R (S) 77 
3 At para [4] 
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burglar4, which is structured much more as an individual deterrent. The house 
burglar falls foul of the minimum sentence only when he has been convicted 
and sentenced for two earlier house burglaries committed on separate 
occasions.5 That minimum sentence is clearly designed to address the repeated 
failings of an individual defendant, while the minimum sentence for firearms 
offences applies to a first offender just as much as to the recidivist. That the 
underlying rationale of the firearms provision is general deterrence is apparent 
from judicial comments in other decisions of the Court of Appeal, such as those 
of Lord Judge CJ in Wilkinson:6 
 
‘The gravity of gun crime cannot be exaggerated … Sentencing courts 
must address the fact that too many lethal weapons are too readily 
available: too many are carried, always with devastating effect on 
individual victims and with insidious corrosive impact on the well-being 
of the local community.’(emphasis added) 
 
Deterrence is, of course, one of the aims of sentencing listed in the Criminal 
Justice Act 2003, but no priority is assigned amongst those aims.7 Regard must 
always be had to section 143 of the Act, which says that when assessing the 
seriousness of any offence, the court must consider the offender’s culpability 
and any harm caused or risked. All the Sentencing Council offence guidelines 
are based upon crime seriousness, and require judges to address culpability and 
harm in detail at Stage 1 of the relevant guideline, in order to select the 
appropriate sentencing range and starting point at Stage 2. However, the 
minimum custodial sentence for firearms is one of the provisions which is 
exempted by statute from the normal proportionality requirements - that a 
custodial sentence should only be imposed where the offence is ‘so serious’ that 
neither a fine nor a community sentence can be justified8 and that any custodial 
sentence imposed for the offence ‘must be for the shortest term that in the 
opinion of the court is commensurate with the seriousness of the offence’9 The 
interplay between these statutory requirements is not as clear as it might be, but 
it is apparent that the minimum sentence for firearms erects a substantial 
obstacle to normal proportionality requirements of sentencing, that obstacle 
being rooted in general deterrence.  
 
                                                          
4 Powers of Criminal Courts Act 2000, s.111 
5 See Hoare [2004] 2 Cr App R (S) 50 
6 Wilkinson [2010] 1 Cr App R (S) 100. It is fair to say that the minimum sentence was not directly in issue in the 
appeals heard in this case, but the Court considered the minimum sentence as part of its review of the gravity 
of gun crime and the need to impose ‘deterrent and punitive sentences’. 
7 CJA 2003.s.142, a section referred to Professor Ashworth as embodying ‘the worst of ‘pick and mix’ 
sentencing’: Sentencing and Criminal Justice, 6th ed, 2015, p.82 
8 CJA 2003, s.152(1A) and (2) 
9 CJA 2003, s.153(2) and (3) 
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Problematising General Deterrence 
 
There are, of course, two main problems with general deterrence. The first is the 
empirical question of whether or not it works to reduce the future offending of 
others. The second is the level of injustice which may be occasioned to 
individual defendants who fall foul of the policy and find themselves severely 
sentenced as a means to achieve a general public goal.10 As to the first issue, 
there is a dearth of evidence that mandatory sentences for firearms offences 
have a general deterrent effect. Most of the research on this issue has been 
carried out in the United States, where minimum sentences have a much longer 
history, and the studies have been evaluated by Tonry11, and by Makarios and 
Pratt12. In England there is little empirical evidence, but the leading academic 
study on general deterrence is highly sceptical that increases in sentencing 
levels can generate deterrent effects.13 These research findings on deterrence 
were broadly accepted by John Halliday in his Report14 which prefigured the 
2003 Act, but the 5-year minimum firearms sentence stands as an obstinate 
tribute to legislative reluctance to accept the evidence which is available. 
 
By contrast to the position in England in Wales the Canadian Supreme Court, in 
the important case of Nur15, recently exercised its power under the Charter of 
Rights and Freedoms to strike down as ‘unconstitutional’ mandatory minimum 
sentences of three years and five years for possession of firearms imposed by 
section 95 of the Criminal Code. The Code sets out a range of sentencing 
objectives in section 718, but then goes on to assert that the ‘fundamental 
principle’ of sentencing is that the ‘sentence must be proportionate to the 
gravity of the offence and the degree of responsibility of the offender’16 . In 
giving her judgment on behalf of the majority in this case McLachlan CJC 
expressly relied upon the research studies (cited in footnote 11) as well as 
                                                          
10 Andrew Ashworth, Sentencing and Criminal Justice, 6th ed, 2015, pp.83-88 
11 A.N. Doob and C.M. Webster, ‘Sentence severity and crime: accepting the null hypothesis’ (2003) 30 Crime 
and Justice: A Review of Research 143; A.N. Doob and C. Cesaroni, ‘The political attractiveness of mandatory 
minimum sentences’ (2001) Osgoode Hall Law Journal 287; M. Tonry, ‘The mostly unintended consequences of 
mandatory penalties’ (2009) Crime and Justice: A Review of Research, University of Chicago Press, 65; see also 
‘Mandatory penalties’ chap 5 in M.Tonry, Sentencing Matters, 1996, Oxford   
12 M.D. Makarios and T.C.Pratt, ‘‘The effectiveness of policies and programs that attempt to reduce firearm 
violence: a meta-analysis’ (2012) 58 Crime & Delinquency 222 
13 A von Hirsch, A.E. Bottoms, E. Burney and P-O Wikstrom, Criminal Deterrence and Sentence Severity, 2009, 
University of Cambridge Institute of Criminology 
14 J. Halliday, Making Punishments Work: Report of a Review of the Sentencing Framework in England and 
Wales, 2001, Home Office  
15 [2015] 1 R.C.S 773 
16 S.718.1 
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reports of the Canadian Sentencing Commission17 which has voiced scepticism 
about efforts to achieve general deterrence through deployment of minimum 
sentences. It is very unusual, at least from an English perspective, to see an 
appellate court taking the research evidence seriously, and acting so decisively 
upon it. Apart from the lack of evidence about the efficacy of deterrence, the 
court in Nur was acutely aware of the risk of injustice to individual defendants. 
The Court said that: ‘Put simply, a person cannot be made to suffer a grossly 
disproportionate punishment simply to send a message to discourage others 
from offending.’18 More is said about the case of Nur below. 
 
While never casting doubt on the principle of general deterrence, the English 
judiciary has on numerous occasions expressed concern about the potential 
harshness of the minimum sentence for certain defendants. In Rehman and 
Wood Lord Woolf CJ said that section 51A, with its emphasis on the deterrent 
message rather than the risk actually posed by the offender, was capable of 
operating in an ‘arbitrary fashion’.19 This was because, in particular, the listed 
offences were ones of possession, and of strict liability. His Lordship observed 
that ‘if an offender has no idea that he is doing anything wrong, a deterrent 
sentence will have no deterrent effect on him’.20 Conviction would follow 
without proof of intention, or without understanding of the unlawfulness of the 
conduct: his Lordship said that this was ‘of great significance’ as to how the 
minimum sentence should be construed. That is because in offences of strict 
liability issues of defendant culpability are not relevant to guilt, but should still 
be accorded appropriate weight at the sentencing stage.21 An example is 
Boateng22, where it was accepted that the defendant genuinely did not know that 
a bag left at her flat by another person contained a gun and ammunition. 
Another is where the defendant is genuinely unaware that it is against the law to 
be in possession of the weapon. In a series of cases including Stoker23 and 
Beaman24 the Court of Appeal was concerned with a defendant in possession of 
a taser / stun gun disguised as something else – such as a mobile phone. These 
devices fall within the terms of the section and attract 5 year minimum 
sentences.25 Stoker had purchased the item openly over the internet, and 
                                                          
17 Canadian Sentencing Commission, Sentencing Reform: A Canadian Approach, 1987. The Commission 
expressed ‘strong reservations about the deterrence efficacy of legal sanctions … to produce particular effects 
with regard to a specific offence.’ 
18 At [45] 
19 Rehman and Wood, at para [12] 
20 Rehman and Wood, at para [14]. It is noticeable here that the argument slides from general deterrence to 
individual deterrence. 
21 See A Ashworth, ‘Firearms and justice’ [2013] Crim LR 447 (editorial) 
22 [2011] 2 Cr App R (S) 104 (five years reduced to two years) 
23 [2014] 1 Cr App R (S) 47 (five years reduced to two years) 
24 Rogers [2016] EWCA Crim 801, in relation to the appellant Beaman (five years reduced to two and a half 
years) See also Zhekov [2014] 1 Cr App R (S) 69 
25 See the analysis in Brereton [2012] 2 Cr App R (S) 69 
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Beaman had bought his in Bulgaria, where its possession is not against the law. 
Both defendants claimed (and this was accepted) that they had no idea that 
possession of the device was unlawful. In other cases the facts are different but 
the issue is the same. In Cochrane v HM Advocate26 the defendant was in 
possession of a handgun which her father, who had died 28 years earlier, had 
kept as a souvenir from his service in the Second World War. The gun had 
never been unwrapped or removed from its box, and there was no ammunition 
for it. The defendant said that it had never occurred to her that she needed a 
licence for it. In all these cases the minimum sentence of 5 years was imposed 
by the sentencing court, but later reduced on appeal, by reference to 
‘exceptional circumstances’.  
 
Legislative Over-reach and the Decision in Nur  
 
In 2015 section 95(2)(a) of the Canadian Criminal Code imposed mandatory 
minimum sentences of 3 years for a first offence and 5 years for a subsequent 
offence for possession of a prohibited or restricted firearm when the firearm is 
loaded or kept with readily accessible ammunition. It is important to note at this 
stage that the Canadian provision allows no concession at all to the presence of 
‘exceptional circumstances’, which the English provision does recognise. 
‘Exceptional circumstances’ are considered further below. The Court in Nur 
held that 
 
‘mandatory minimum sentences … function as a blunt instrument that 
may deprive courts of the ability to tailor proportionate sentences [and] 
they may, in extreme cases, impose unjust sentences, because they shift 
the focus from the offender during the sentencing process in a way that 
violates the principle of proportionality.’27 
 
The Court found, by a 6-3 majority, that the minimum sentences amounted to a 
‘cruel and unusual treatment or punishment’28 since it was clear that they could 
lead to grossly disproportionate sentences for those offenders at the lower end 
of the offence spectrum. The Court referred, in particular, to ‘the licensed and 
responsible gun owner who stores his unloaded firearm safely with ammunition 
nearby, but makes a mistake as to where it can be stored’, for whom a 3 year 
sentence would be grossly disproportionate.29 The judgement is principled, 
impressive, and potentially far-reaching. The case is particularly striking, since 
                                                          
26 [2010] HCJAC 117  This is a Scottish case, but the law is the same (five years reduced to community service 
order). One judge dissented, and would have upheld the minimum sentence. 
27 At [44] 
28 Thereby violating section 12 of the Charter  
29 At [82]. The minority judges argued that this hypothetical was far-fetched, and that no such cases had 
actually come before the courts. 
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neither of the two appellants fell at the lower end of the range, and the Supreme 
Court in fact upheld sentences longer than the respective minimum terms in 
both their cases. Nur was a 19 year-old student of previous good character who 
was convicted of ‘possessing a prohibited firearm when the firearm is loaded or 
kept with readily accessible ammunition’. That offence attracts a minimum 
three-year sentence, and Nur received a custodial sentence of 40 months. The 
defendant had been reported to the police as being in possession of a loaded 
semi-automatic weapon, which he discarded when the police arrived on the 
scene. The other appellant, Charles, was convicted of a second or subsequent 
like offence, which carries a minimum five-year sentence. He was found by 
police to have a semi-automatic handgun and ammunition at his apartment, and 
he was a man with a serious criminal history including five offences of violence 
and five firearms-related offences. He received a seven-year sentence. 
 
The judges in the majority did accept that, in principle, minimum sentences 
might be appropriate legislative tools, and might be deployed in dealing with 
gun crime. These particular provisions were, however, struck down because of 
their potential over-reach. The majority also roundly rejected an argument that 
such over-reach could be dealt with by relying upon the prosecution to proceed 
summarily and thereby avoid the maximum penalties, or by choosing to charge 
offences which did not carry them: 
 
‘… the section cannot be salvaged by relying on the discretion of the 
prosecution not to apply the law in those cases where, in the opinion of 
the prosecution, its application would be a violation of the Charter … 
[T]he courts are duty bound to make that pronouncement, and not to 
delegate the avoidance of a violation to the prosecution or to anyone else 
for that matter.’30  
 
The Supreme Court had to deal with another challenge to a different minimum 
sentence in Lloyd31, where the defendant was made subject to the one-year 
minimum sentence for drug possession with intent to traffic (supply). That 
sentence was increased to 18 months by the British Columbia Court of Appeal, 
but the Supreme Court again moved to declare the minimum sentence provision 
to be unconstitutional. Noting that the minimum sentence was capable of 
applying not just to the serious drug trafficker but also to an offender who was 
an addict, in possession of a small quantity of drugs to share with a friend, 
McLachlan CJC said that imposition of the mandatory one-year sentence in 
such a case would be ‘grossly disproportionate to what is fit in the 
                                                          
30 For consideration of the circumstances in which it might be appropriate to prosecute an offence involving a 
disguised stun-gun by charging an offence which does not carry the minimum sentence see Ramzan [2013] 2 
Cr App R (S) 33 and the commentary on that case by Dr Thomas at [2013] Crim LR 526. 
31 Lloyd [2016] SCC 13  
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circumstances, and would shock the conscience of Canadians’.32 The judges in 
the minority pointed out that, in respect of this minimum sentence, there was an 
exemption provided for an offender who chose to attend and completed 
successfully an approved treatment programme between his conviction and 
sentence. This did not impress the majority, however, who said that the 
exemption was too narrow. What was needed was a proper ‘safety valve’ 
written in to the legislation to allow judges to exempt cases where the minimum 
sentence would be unjust. 
 
 
Exceptional Circumstances 
 
As explained above, the Canadian firearm minimum sentence which was 
declared unconstitutional in Nur allowed for no exceptional circumstances. The 
English provision in section 51A does do so, and that is an important difference 
between the English and Canadian provisions. While the English firearms 
provision requires ‘exceptional circumstances’ to avoid the maximum sentence, 
other English minimum sentences, such as the ‘three-strikes’ burglary 
provision, require ‘particular circumstances’ relevant to the offender or to the 
offence(s) which would render the minimum sentence ‘unjust’, and it has 
become clear that the former is the more stringent test. The judicial power to 
find exceptional circumstances was, however, central to the reasoning of the 
Court of Appeal in Rehman and Wood when it rejected an argument that section 
51A was incompatible with Arts 3 and 5 of the ECHR.33 The Court found that 
the words of the section were capable of being interpreted as complying with 
the Convention. In that case Lord Woolf CJ said that the sentencing judge must 
decide what the exceptional circumstances were, and unless the judge had 
clearly made a mistake the Court of Appeal would not interfere. His Lordship 
said that circumstances were exceptional 
 
‘… if it would mean that to impose five years imprisonment would result 
in an arbitrary and disproportionate sentence … A holistic approach is 
needed. There will be cases where there is one single striking feature, 
which relates either to the offence or the offender, which causes that case 
to fall within the requirement of exceptional circumstances. There can be 
other cases where no single factor by itself will amount to exceptional 
circumstances, but the collective impact of all the relevant circumstances 
truly makes the case exceptional’. 
 
His Lordship also said that it was important not to divide circumstances into 
those which are capable of being exceptional and those which are not. 
                                                          
32 At para [33] 
33 See also Barber [2006] 1 Cr App R (S) 90  
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Exceptional circumstances were found in Rehman, one of the two cases under 
appeal, where the defendant was a man of previous good character who had 
pleaded guilty at the first opportunity, and the weapon was a replica which he 
had purchased as a collector’s model. The gun had not been converted for use, 
there was no ammunition for it, and it was still in its original wrapping. The 5 
year sentence imposed by the sentencing judge was accordingly reduced to 12 
months. In the years since that decision there has been much case law on the 
issue of exceptional circumstances. Most of it is highly fact-specific, and the 
cases are summarised in the standard works.34 That material is not repeated in 
any detail here but, for the purpose of this article, it is important to note that the 
Court has over time retreated from the flexible approach set out in Rehman. It 
has reasserted the importance of the underlying policy of general deterrence, 
and has become much more reluctant to accept that circumstances really are 
‘exceptional’. In Jordan35 the Court stressed that findings of exceptional 
circumstances would be ‘rare’, and in Wilkinson36 the Court said that possession 
of a firearm was always a grave crime, and if the offence was within the terms 
of the minimum sentence provision, something ‘truly exceptional’ was required 
before a lower sentence could be passed. An important re-emphasis of 
deterrence policy came in Culpeper37, where the Court effectively put an end to 
a line of decisions including Edwards38 where exceptional circumstances had 
been found in relation to vulnerable women who had accepted custody of a 
firearm when under threats short of duress.39 Culpeper was strongly endorsed in 
Greenfield40, where the Court repeated that the phrase ‘exceptional 
circumstances’ must not be diluted, would be found only in ‘rare cases’, and 
that sentencing judges must do their statutory duty and not be swayed by 
sympathy for the offender (nor for the offender’s family41). The facts of that 
case (female drug addict pressurised by drug dealer to store firearm at her flat) 
were ‘all too familiar’ and ‘do not come close to equating to exceptional’42. The 
Court also took the view (contrary to what was said in Rehman and Wood), that 
‘in determining what constitutes exceptional circumstances, we are in as good a 
position as the trial judge’.  
 
 
The Guilty Plea Problem 
                                                          
34 Such as DA Thomas, Current Sentencing Practice, A1-15A 
35 [2005] 2 Cr App R (S) 44 
36 Wilkinson [2010] 1 Cr App R (S) 100 
37 [2014] 1 Cr App R (S) 62 (two years increased to five years) 
38 [2007] 1 Cr App R (S) 111 
39 See also Jones [2012] 1 Cr App R (S) 25 (5 years reduced to 6 months – ‘if ever there was a case of 
exceptional circumstances, this was it’ per Laws LJ 
40 [2016] 2 Cr App R (S) 23 (three and a half years increased to 5 years) 
41 Davidson [2016] EWCA Crim 1626 (12 months suspended sentence increased to 5 years) 
42 Greenfield, at [24] (emphasis added) 
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Section 51A is famously silent on what, if any, credit is available in these cases 
for a guilty plea. The standard provision in section 144 of the 2003 Act and the 
associated sentencing guideline, are extremely well known, and there is a 
provision dealing with reduction for plea attached to every other minimum 
sentence provision. There is no indication in the Parliamentary debates on the 
firearms minimum sentence that a stand-alone rule was intended, there was 
nothing in the explanatory notes issued to accompany the Act, and no 
satisfactory explanation has ever been advanced since. The most likely 
explanation is that the legislature simply overlooked the guilty plea issue. The 
Court of Appeal in Jordan43, however, said that omission of the guilty plea 
reduction was ‘plainly deliberate’ and rejected the view advanced by counsel 
(and some academic writers44) that the standard requirement for reduction for 
plea could properly be read into the firearm sentence. The Court concluded that 
if exceptional circumstances did not apply a reduction for plea should be given, 
always provided that the final sentence did not fall below the minimum of 5 
years.45 If the court does find exceptional circumstances then the appropriate 
proportionate sentence should be imposed, having made the normal adjustment 
for plea. 
 
The operation of this rule adds a further level of complexity, and 
disproportionality, to sentencing in this area, and it was roundly criticised by 
Lord Judge CJ in Nightingale, a case which his Lordship said had been 
‘bedevilled’ by section 51A, a provision ‘which was liable to distort the 
sentencing process’46. If we take the minimum sentence of five years for an 
adult defendant, it is clear that a defendant who would have received a sentence 
of seven and a half years had he contested the case could receive the full one-
third discount in the normal way. However, a defendant who would have 
received a sentence of six years had he contested the case could receive only a 
maximum discount of one sixth, and a defendant who would have received a 
sentence of five years had he contested the case can receive no discount at all. 
This is bizarre in proportionality terms, it conflicts with sentencing practice for 
other offences and, of course, it runs against the normal policy of encouraging 
all defendants to plead guilty at the earliest opportunity. If the sentencing court 
does, in spite of everything, manage to find that there are exceptional 
circumstances, then according to Jordan the reduction for plea is then ‘at large’ 
and the normal reduction should be given. However, there is some authority 
                                                          
43 [2005] 2 Cr App R (S) 266 
44 Taylor, R, Wasik, M and Leng, R. Blackstone’s Guide to the CJA 2003, 2004, Oxford, p.208 
45 This is of course different from the reduction for plea available in other minimum sentence cases, such as 
the 3-strikes house burglary. There the appropriate discount should be given, but (unless ‘particular 
circumstances’ apply) the final sentence must not fall below 80 per cent of the 3 year minimum sentence. 
46 [2012] EWCA Crim 2734 
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which states that even where exceptional circumstances are found, the sentence 
starting point should still be five years.47 
 
  
Towards Sentencing Guidelines in Firearms Cases 
 
Section 51A was not the first minimum sentence to reach the statute books, and 
it has not been the last. Nobody doubts the right of Parliament to set sentencing 
policy through legislation, and the temptation to pass minimum sentences as a 
public relations exercise is obvious. Even so, given the role of the Sentencing 
Council, there is simply no need for minimum sentences at all. Sentencing 
ranges and starting points based on harm and culpability should be set for all 
offences (including firearms offences), and that is the job description of the 
Sentencing Council, as provided for by statute. Minimum sentences are 
generally an obstacle to the development of sentencing guidelines. The ‘three-
strikes’ burglary minimum sentence caused problems in early attempts to 
develop a sentencing guideline for burglary.48 In the Sentencing Council 
guideline it is dealt with by a very short comment to judges that when they have 
worked through the guideline they should make sure that the statutory provision 
has not been infringed.49 Could a similar line be taken in a firearms guideline? 
Judges could be required to work through the guideline to determine the 
proportionate sentence (absent the minimum sentence provision) and then 
compare the proportionate sentence with the minimum sentence to decide 
whether to impose the minimum sentence would be ‘arbitrary or 
disproportionate’ (as Lord Woolf expressed it in Rehman and Wood). It seems, 
however, that the firearms minimum sentence would be much harder, if not 
impossible, to incorporate into a Sentencing Council guideline. That is because 
(i) a minimum sentence based on the idea of general deterrence is completely at 
odds with a guideline rooted in proportionality, (ii) the firearms minimum 
sentence is five years (not three years) and it applies to all defendants 
irrespective of their record, (iii) there is a higher hurdle to find ‘exceptional 
circumstances’ so as to pass a sentence of less than five years than the ‘fairly 
substantial degree of discretion’50 which judges have to find ‘particular 
circumstances’ for not imposing the minimum sentence for the third burglary, 
and (iv) there is the completely anomalous rule on reduction for a plea of guilty.  
 
There is appellate guidance for courts on sentencing in firearms cases. This was 
provided by the Court of Appeal in 1998 (well before the creation of the 
                                                          
47 Beard [2008] 2 Cr App R (S) 41 
48 See McInerney and Keating [2003] 2 Cr App R (S) 29 considering the advice of the Sentencing Advisory Panel 
on this issue; Saw [2009] 2 Cr App R (S) 54 
49 See Andrews [2013] 2 Cr App R (S) 5 and Silvera [2013] EWCA Crim 1764 
50 Per Lord Woolf CJ in McInerney and Keating, at [16] 
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minimum sentence) in Avis51, and later expanded upon in Wilkinson52 and 
Sheen53. Avis says that a judge sentencing a firearms case must consider the 
following questions: 
 
  (i) what sort of weapon is involved?  
  (ii) what use, if any, was made of the firearm? 
  (iii) with what intention, if any, did the defendant possess the firearm? 
  (iv) what is the defendant’s record? 
  (v) where was the firearm discharged, and who and how many were exposed to 
danger by its use? 
  (vi) was any injury or damage caused by its discharge, and if so how serious 
was it? 
 
Sentencing in firearms cases requires a ‘structured approach’54, including an 
explicit consideration of the Avis questions in every case, whether section 51A 
is engaged or not. If section 51A is in issue, Avis must be gone through first. 
While the Avis questions are fine as far as they go, they fall well short of the 
structure and detail of a comprehensive Sentencing Council guideline. In the 
Avis questions issues of harm and culpability are mixed together, rather than 
being addressed and rated separately, and in a guideline the defendant’s record 
should not be a primary issue but operate as a secondary matter of aggravation 
or mitigation. The answers to the Avis questions might help to identify what 
circumstances, if any, are sufficiently ‘exceptional’ to avoid the minimum 
sentence. Recent decisions, including Rogers55, have stressed that disputed 
issues of fact, especially those relating to the defendant’s degree of culpability 
for the offence, must be clearly identified. Defence counsel should set these out 
in writing and, if they are disputed by the prosecution, the judge should hold a 
Newton hearing to resolve them, with the prosecution required to prove their 
version to the criminal standard.56 As Sharp LJ observed in Davidson57, the 
benefit of adopting the Newton hearing approach in a minimum sentence case is 
that 
 
‘it prevents ‘fudge’: it concentrates the mind of all in court before the 
sentence is determined on the matters that are said to be exceptional and 
whether they surmount the exceptionality threshold, whether on their own 
or looked at collectively’. 
                                                          
51 [1998] 1 Cr App R 420 
52 Wilkinson [2010] 1 Cr App R (S) 100 
53 [2012] 2 Cr App R (S) 3 
54 Withers [2015] EWCA Crim 132 
55 Rogers [2016] EWCA Crim 801 (in respect of the appellant Beaman). See also McCleary [2014] EWCA Crim 
302 and McCarthy [2013] EWCA Crim 2500 
56 And see Lashari [2011] 1 Cr App R (S) 72 
57 Davidson [2016] EWCA Crim 1626 
12 
 
 
Greater clarity as to the approach in determining exceptional circumstances is 
welcome, but it should be remembered that an important consequences for the 
defendant of not being believed on a Newton hearing is loss of some of the 
normal discount for plea. As we have seen, reduction for plea in firearms cases 
operates in a highly eccentric fashion, and where the starting point (before 
reduction for plea) is at or around the five year mark no reduction at all can be 
given. If the defendant loses the Newton hearing in such a case, it will become 
highly artificial for the judge to explain in open court what proportion of the 
reduction for plea has thereby been forfeited. 
 
 
Conclusion 
 
It is submitted that proper sentencing guidelines, set out in the now-familiar 
Sentencing Council format, are required for firearms offences, and only the 
Sentencing Council (and not the Court of Appeal) can provide them.58 The 
underlying rationale for Council guidelines is proportionality, not general 
deterrence. The minimum sentence in firearms cases is an unprincipled and 
unnecessary exception to the prevailing principle of proportionality in 
determining the form and length of sentence. It shares the usual defects of 
minimum sentences, in being over-broad, and allowing insufficient scope for 
judges to make appropriate adjustment for individual cases. In addition, it 
seriously distorts the otherwise generally applicable principles of reduction for a 
guilty plea. Its repeal should be a legislative priority, because its removal is a 
prerequisite to the production of comprehensive sentencing guidelines for 
firearms offences. 
 
                                                          
58 See the remarks of Leveson LJ in Dyer [2014] 2 Cr App R (S) 11 as to the respective roles of the Court and the 
Council 
